On April 28, 2026, Bruegel launched a new tracking tool documenting the fiscal measures taken by European governments in response to the energy shock following the war with Iran on February 28, 2026, and the subsequent closure of the Strait of Hormuz. The analysis covers only measures with a clearly defined budget—measures with an unspecified amount or those that are budget-neutral are excluded, making the estimate of the total amount quite conservative.
As of May 5, 2026, European governments have committed over €11 billion to short-term fiscal measures. In absolute terms, Spain leads with €5 billion, or nearly half of the total amount, followed by Germany (€1.62 billion) and the Netherlands (€967 million). As a share of GDP, the leaders are Spain, Bulgaria, Greece, and Ireland.
A key finding by the authors (McWilliams, Mramor, Roth, Tagliapietra) is that over 72% of the committed funds (€8.3 billion) are squandered on untargeted measures—general reductions in excise taxes or VAT on energy products, without targeting by income group or other criteria. This directly contradicts the recommendations of both the European Commission (communication of April 22, 2026) as well as the ECB (statement by Christine Lagarde on April 20, 2026), which recommend targeted support for vulnerable households and energy-intensive sectors.
Of the 41 registered measures, only 3 are aimed exclusively at electricity—the overwhelming majority cover fossil fuels or a combination of fuels and electricity. This reflects the structure of the energy shock (oil and gas), but at the same time raises questions about compatibility with decarbonization goals.
In the Bulgarian context, the table shows €225 million allocated across two measures:
- Transport Support Package – €100 million
- Electricity Support Scheme for Industry – €125 million, with retroactive effect for the period July 2025 – June 2026
It is striking that Bulgaria ranks among the “leaders” in terms of fiscal effort as a share of GDP, alongside Spain, Greece, and Ireland. The retroactive nature of the industrial scheme is a specific feature that warrants attention from a regulatory perspective, as it raises questions regarding compatibility with state aid rules and the Temporary Crisis and Transition Framework (TCTF).
Bruegel’s conclusions echo the criticism that EMI raised during the 2022–2023 crisis: European governments are repeating the pattern of broad, untargeted price interventions that (i) are fiscally costly, (ii) keep the price signal muted, weakening incentives to reduce consumption, and (iii) effectively subsidize fossil fuel consumption, contradicting the goals of REPowerEU and the Clean Industry Pact.
It is also worth noting that in the accompanying article published on the tracker, “The fiscal fault lines of Europe’s energy shock” (May 5, 2026), the authors emphasize that the crisis once again reveals the asymmetric fiscal capacity of member states—a circumstance of strategic importance for the discussion on common European instruments for energy security.
A special tracker detailing specific government interventions and measures by country from around the world can also be accessed on the International Energy Agency’s website—https://www.iea.org/data-and-statistics/data-tools/2026-energy-crisis-policy-response-tracker.
